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DOUBLE JEOPARDY'S MULTIPUNISHMENT
PROTECTION AND REGULATION OF CIVIL
SANCTIONS AFTER UNITED STATES v. URSERY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Double Jeopardy Clause provides a vital constitutional protection for defendants in the American criminal justice system.' Through
its common law evolution, double jeopardy has safeguarded criminal
defendants from three governmental actions.2 As its most well-recognized power, double jeopardy prevents the state from prosecuting a
criminal defendant for the same offense following an acquittal.3 Double
jeopardy also prohibits the state from prosecuting a criminal defendant
for the same offense after a conviction.4 Finally, the Double Jeopardy
Clause's multipunishment protection forbids the state from punishing the
criminal defendant more than once for the same offense.5
In recent years, the scope of double jeopardy's multipunishment
protection has become an increasingly litigated issue in criminal law, and
particularly as it applies to civil sanctions imposed in conjunction with
criminal penalties.6 Criminal defendants, facing both civil and criminal

1. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §24.1 (1985)
(citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969)).
2. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969).
3. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184
(1957).
4. In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
5. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717 (citing United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304,307 (1931); Ex
Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall) 163 (1873)). Justice Antonin Scalia would differ on this point.
See Dep't. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 798 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). As will be further highlighted in this article, Scalia finds that the double jeopardy
doctrine protects only from successive prosecutions. lid; see also infra Part III.
6. For purposes of this article and unless otherwise indicated, the term "civil sanction"
shall be used to refer to a civil enforcement tool brought by the government against a criminal
defendant or the criminal defendant's material possessions to force compliance with the law
or administrative regulations. Civil sanctions take a variety of procedural forms and can
include in rem forfeiture actions which are brought to recover the proceeds, instrumentalities,
or contraband involved in the defendant's criminal activities. Civil sanctions can also include
in personam actions which are brought personally against the defendant to recover restitution
for the defendant's offense. Civil tax actions as well as various other administrative penalties
can also fall within the realm of civil sanctions. For a general discussion of these distinctions,
see The Supreme Court: Recent Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 211 (1996) (citing Mary M.
Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick,and ProfitableAlso Be Fair?Runaway Civil Forfeiture
Stumbles on the Constitution,39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1994)). See infra note 20, for
examples of recent attempts by defendants to use the multipunishment protection to invalidate
civil sanctions imposed in conjunction with a criminal penalty.
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sanctions for one offense, have raised the multipunishment defense to
avoid the imposition of both sanctions.7 Defendants have argued that
some civil sanctions imposed by the government criminally punish a
defendant a second time for the same conduct.'
The multipunishment defense arose for two general reasons. First,
defendants perceived that the multipunishment protection had been
expanded by the United States Supreme Court to apply to a wider array
of civil sanctions.9 Second, the government's expanded use of civil
sanctions in its law enforcement activities created more opportunities for
this type of double jeopardy litigation."0
In United States v. Ursery," the Supreme Court clarified the Double
Jeopardy Clause's multipunishment protection and its power to
invalidate excessive civil forfeitures that are applied in conjunction with
criminal penalties. 2 Under the Ursery decision, the Court limited the
multipunishment protection to all but a few civil sanction cases. 3 In
restricting the multipunishment protection, the Court stated that it was
merely following long-established precedent-even though more recent
Court cases had seemingly expanded the multipunishment protection. 4
The most important feature of the Ursery decision, however, is that it
marks a definitive reversal of a perceived trend toward a broader
multipunishment protection. 5 While the Ursery decision may be the
final statement on the scope of the multipunishment protection, the
opinion has raised questions about whether the Court has gone too far
in lessening the power of this doctrine when individual defendants
continue to face what could arguably be characterized as "punishing"

7. See Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994); United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
8. For a brief survey of the various contexts in which defendants advocated a
multipunishment defense, see infra note 20.
9. See Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994); United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
10. See The Supreme Court Recent Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 215 (1996) (citing
Memorandum from Gerald E. McDowell, Chief, Asset Forfeiture & Money Laundering
Section, U.S. Department of Justice, to Philip Heymann, Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School 7 (Jan. 23, 1996)) (noting that the federal government seized $1.3 billion in property
forfeitures in the first 9 months of 1995 alone).
11. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2143-45.
14. Id at 2147-48 (citing United States v. 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); One Lot of
Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. 232 (1972); Various Items of Personal Property v. United States,
282 U.S. 577 (1931)).
15. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2144-45 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989)).
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civil sanctions.16
Past precedent in this area provides the best perspective on how this
new decision impacts the multipunishment protection and how the Court
has grappled with defining "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes.
A series of decisions rendered immediately prior to Ursery illustrate this
problem most vividly.17 As those cases demonstrate, the Court's test
for when a civil forfeiture constituted "punishment" created a subjective
determination that allowed little room for agreement.18 Yet, at the
same time, the Supreme Court declared that a civil sanction that could
be fairly characterized as "punitive" must be invalidated under the
multipunishment protection. 9
Although its rationale may be questionable, the precedent established
in Ursery has significantly impacted the confusing application of double
jeopardy to civil sanctions. For example, numerous lower court decisions
have consistently used Ursery to limit the application of the multipunishment defense in a variety of contexts.' Inevitably, the question of

16. See, e.g., The Supreme Court,Recent Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1996).
17. See Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994); United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S.435 (1989).
18. See, eg., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
19. Il at 448-449.
20. Federal courts have used Ursery to reject the multipunishment defense in a variety
of situations. See, e.g., United States v. One Parcel of Real Property at 154 Manley Road, 91
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996) (forfeiture of property used in drug offense); United States v. Amiel, 95
F.3d 135, 146 (2nd Cir. 1996) (forfeiture of art work used in mail fraud); United States v.
Stemolkos, 100 F.3d 302, 311 (3rd Cir. 1996) (forfeiture of home due to illegal misrepresentation in naturalization application); United States v. Glymph, 96 F.3d 722, 725 (4th Cir. 1996)
(debarment from government contracting by supplying non-conforming military goods); United
States v. Keeton, 101 F.3d 48, 51 (6th Cir. 1996) (forfeiture of truck and personal goods used
in drug trafficking); United States v. $87,118.00 in United States Currency, 95 F.3d 511, 514
(7th Cir. 1996) (forfeiture of moneys used in conspiracy to import heroin); United States v.
Kress, 88 F.3d 664 (8th Cir. 1996) (forfeiture of firearms used in conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine); United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 91 F.3d 1204, 1210
(9th Cir. 1996) (forfeiture of aircraft used in drug trafficking); United States v. Bailey, 104 F.3d
368 (10th Cir. 1996) (forfeiture of currency seized in connection with drug trafficking); United
States v. Two Parcels of Real Property Located in Russell County, Alabama, 92 F.3rd 1123,
1129 (11th Cir. 1996) (forfeiture of property purchased with proceeds from the sale of
controlled substances); United States v. Coleman, 940 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (forfeiture of currency from money laundering operation).
Ursery has also been adopted in a variety of contexts in state courts. See, e.g., Sims v.
State, 930 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Ark. 1996) (forfeiture of currency used in connection with
possession of controlled substances); People v. Shanndoah, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232,234 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (forfeiture of currency used in connection with drug offense); Deutschendorf v.
People, 920 P.2d 53, 59 (Colo. 1996) (forfeiture of operator's license in conjunction with
driving-while-intoxicated charge); Covelli v. Comm'r of Revenue Services, 683 A.2d 737
(Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (drug tax imposed after criminal drug possession); In re 1982 Honda,
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whether the Supreme Court's decision is founded on a workable premise
and makes good public policy must be answered.
This Comment examines the Supreme Court's recent treatment of
the Double Jeopardy Clause's multipunishment protection, with emphasis
on the Court's decision in United States v. Ursery.21 Part II of this
Comment will trace the history of the Double Jeopardy Clause's
2 and
multipunishment protection to its use in United States v. Halper"
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch.' Part II will also
examine the interplay between the multipunishment protection and
United States v. Austin,24 in which the Supreme Court indicated that the
Excessive Fines Clause offers some complimentary powers to double
jeopardy's multipunishment protection. Part III analyzes a corollary
double jeopardy issue, assessing Justice Scalia's contention that no
legitimate historical or constitutional basis exists for the multipunishment
681 A.2d 1035, 1036 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (forfeiture of auto used in drug trafficking); State
v. Powelson, 680 So.2d 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (forfeiture under Florida's Contraband
Forfeiture Statute); Murphy v. State, 475 S.E.2d 907, 908 (Ga. 1996) (forfeiture of currency
proceeds from illegal drug distribution); State v. Tiupuapua, 925 P.2d 311 (Haw. 1996)
(forfeiture of automobile used in burglary); State v. McGough, 924 P.2d 633, 635 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1996) (forfeiture of truck and currency used in the purchase of methamphetamine);
People v. Ratliff, 669 N.E.2d 122, 124 (111. App. Ct. 1996) (civil fines, storage expenses in
connection with unlawful possession of automobile); State v. Sonnier, 679 So.2d 1011, 1012
(La. Ct. App. 1996) (forfeiture of operator's license suspension imposed in conjunction with
driving while intoxicated charge); Albano v. Commonwealth, 667 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. 1996)
(forfeiture of money, cellular phone, and proceeds from a motor vehicle used in illicit drug
distribution); Jones v. State, 681 A.2d 1190, 1198 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (forfeiture of
truck used in drug trafficking); State v. O'Connor, 681 A.2d 475, 477 (Me. 1996) (administrative removal of prisoner's good time credit for assault on prison guard in conjunction with
criminal assault charges); State v. Scott, 933 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (forfeiture
of currency gained through various drug offenses); State v. Schnittgen, 922 P.2d 500, 504
(Mont. 1996) (termination of state job after criminal mischief conviction); State v. $3,000 in
United States Currency, 678 A.2d 741, 743 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (forfeiture of
automobile and cash used in connection with a drug crime); Umatilla County v. $18,005 in
United States Currency, 921 P.2d 426, 428 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (forfeiture of money used in
connection with possession of controlled substances); Commonwealth v. Trayer, 680 A.2d 1166,
1167 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (forfeiture of automobile and cellular phone used in connection
with drug trafficking); Blessing v. State, 927 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1996) (forfeiture
of home used in marijuana manufacturing); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d 765, 767
(Va. Ct. App. 1996) (forfeiture of vehicle used in driving under the influence offense); Tellevik
v. Real Property Known as 6717 100th St. Located in Pierce County, 921 P.2d 1088, 1091
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (forfeiture of home used in marijuana manufacturing); State v. Greene,
473 S.E.2d 921, 925 (W. Va. 1996) (forfeiture of truck and cellular phone used in connection
with possession of controlled substances).
21. 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996).
22. 490 U.S. 433 (1989).
23. 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
24. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
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protection. Part III will also evaluate Scalia's suggestion in his Kurth
Ranch dissent that using the Excessive Fines Clause as an alternative to
the Double Jeopardy Clause presents a better option for regulating civil
forfeitures. Part IV will compare the different standards used by the
Court before Ursery for determining whether a civil sanction constituted
punishment under the multipunishment protection. Finally, Part V will
analyze the viability of the current multipunishment prohibition in light
of Ursery and assess its ramifications for both law enforcement and
criminal defendants.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE'S
MULTIPUNISHMENT PROTECTION

A. The ConstitutionalBeginnings
Protection from multiple punishments has its genesis in a proposed
version of the Double Jeopardy Clause authored by James Madison.'
Madison's version read: "No person shall be subject, except in cases of
impeachment, to more than one punishment or one trial for the same
offense."26 The Framers never incorporated this wording into the final
draft of the Bill of Rights, instead using the legal language that currently
appears in the Fifth Amendment.27 However, as later Supreme Court
decisions demonstrate, the Framers' acceptance of an alternativelyworded Double Jeopardy Clause did not dispose of the provision's ability
to protect from multiple punishments.'
Over three-quarters of a century after the enactment of the Bill of
Rights, the multipunishment protection was formally recognized by the
Supreme Court in Ex Parte Lange.29 In Lange, a jury found the
defendant, Edward Lange, guilty of stealing several mail bags from the
post office.3"
Federal law mandated a sentence of either a fine or
imprisonment for Lange's offense.31 However, the sentencing judge
25. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
26. Id at 753, 767; see generally 1 Senate Journal 105, 119, 130 (1790).
27. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states
in pertinent part: "No person shall ...be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb ...."Id
28. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 341-342 (1975); see also R. Gustave
Lehouck III, Note, A Definition of Punishmentfor Implementing the DoubleJeopardyClause's
Multiple-PunishmentProhibition,90 YALE L.J. 632,635, n. 16 (1981). Cf.Frankfurter's view,
infra notes 62-65, and accompanying text.
29. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
30. Id at 164.
31. Id at 179.
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failed to follow this statutory authorization and ordered both a fine and
imprisonment for Lange.32 Before seeking relief the defendant paid
his fine and began to serve his jail term.33
On habeas review, the Supreme Court overturned the defendant's
sentence on the ground that the trial court exceeded its sentencing power
and jurisdiction by simultaneously ordering fine and imprisonment. 4
While the Court could have settled the legality of Lange's sentence by
looking to the trial judge's violation of the sentencing requirements
under statute, it also based its decision on the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 35 The Court's rationale crystallized double jeopardy's multipunishment protection: "[W]e do not doubt that the Constitution was
designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for
the same offence as from being twice tried for it."'36 The Lange Court
reasoned that double jeopardy implicitly carried both a multiple
prosecution and multipunishment protection.37 It held that two
concepts were synonymous, reasoning that a prosecution, by definition,
will ultimately result in punishment.38 Consequently, the Court
reasoned that if the Clause protects against one of these government
actions, it must necessarily protect against the other.39
The Supreme Court in Lange also recognized that the Double
Jeopardy Clause applies to more than just criminal prosecutions where
"life or limb" are at stake, finding that the Clause shields against
prosecution for "felonies, minor crimes, and misdemeanors alike."''
Recalling that during the framing of the Double Jeopardy Clause most
individuals faced punishments threatening death or corporal punishment,4 the Lange court expressed foresight when it acknowledged that
future punishment could evolve to include other penalties:
[O]n the difficulty of deciding when a statute under modern
systems does or does not describe a felony when it defines or
describes an offence, we shall see.

. .

that the principle intended

32. Id. at 180.
33. Il at 166.
34. Id at 178.
35. Id
36. Id. at 173.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id at 173. Other commentators have also stated that the multipunishment protection
is simply an outgrowth of the reprosecution protection. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD
H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §24.1 (1985).
41. Lange, 85 U.S. at 173.
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to be asserted by the constitutional provision [of double jeopardy]
must be applied to all cases where a second punishment attempted is to be inflicted for the same offense by a judicial sentence.42
With this language, the Court set the foundation for future cases
considering the use of the multipunishment protection as an explicit
component of the Double Jeopardy Clause's powers.
B. Penalty Evaluation Through Statutory Construction
More than half a century after Lange, the Supreme Court again
examined the multipunishment protection of the Double Jeopardy
Clause in Helvering v. Mitchell.43
In Mitchell, the defendant was
charged in federal court with criminal tax evasion, but was acquitted by
a jury.' Despite the acquittal, the government attempted to assess a
civil penalty against Mitchell, which amounted to one-half of his tax
deficiency.45
As one of his chief defenses to the civil penalty, Mitchell pleaded
multipunishment protection. He asserted that although the tax penalty
was sought in a civil action, it was sufficiently punitive in effect to rise
to the level of a second criminal proceeding.46 The Court agreed with
Mitchell that a nominal civil penalty could be barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause if it was designed to serve a punitive purpose: "Unless
this sanction was intended as punishment, so that the proceeding is
essentially criminal, the double jeopardy clause provided for the
defendant in criminal prosecutions is not applicable."'47 The Court
found that the congressional intent behind the legislation was central in
determining whether the civil penalty was effectively a second criminal
punishment:
Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in
respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy
clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second
time to punish criminally for the same offense. The question for
decision is thus whether [the relevant statute] imposes a criminal

42. lit
43. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
44. l& at 396.
45. Id. In the criminal prosecution, the United States charged Mitchell with willfully
evading taxes in the amount of $728,709.84. Id. The government subsequently charged
Mitchell with a civil forfeiture of 50% of that deficiency or $364,354.92 under § 293(b) of the
Revenue Act of 1928, Title I, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 791 (1928). Id. at 395.
46. I1&at 399.
47. Id. at 398-99.
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sanction. The question is one of statutory construction.'
Ultimately, the Mitchell court decided that the tax penalty was not a
punitive measure, but operated as a remedial mechanism designed to
recoup financial losses that the government incurred during the
investigation and prosecution of tax fraud cases.49
From a factual standpoint, Mitchell was not a true multipunishment
case, but rather a multiple prosecution case. Since Mitchell's acquittal
prevented the government from imposing an initial criminal punishment,
any further punitive sanction would not have triggered the protection.
Yet, defendant Mitchell adopted the Lange rationale that prosecution
and punishment can be synonymous, and argued that the tax penalty was
a second criminal prosecution due to its punitive effect." Although the
Court disagreed with Mitchell's argument, the Mitchell precedent's
standard of statutory construction for evaluating whether a sanction
constitutes punishment became a lasting and influential test arising out
of the decision."
Six years after Mitchell, the Court faced a true multipunishment
question in United States ex. rel. Marcus v. Hess.52 In Hess, the
defendants, all Pittsburgh electrical contractors, engaged in collusive
bidding on New Deal construction projects for the Public Works
Administration. 3 They were convicted initially of criminal conspiracy to
defraud the government.54 In a subsequent qui tam action 5 heard by
the Supreme Court, the defendants were sued for civil penalties resulting
from their fraud. 6 The defendants challenged their civil suit as being
violative of the multipunishment protection, alleging that the civil
forfeiture of double damages assessed against them was punitive and

48. Id at 399. The Mitchell court reasoned that because Congress had distinguished
between the civil and criminal penalties in the Revenue Act of 1928 and because Congress
labeled some penalties as civil and provided a civil procedure for pursuing those penalties, the
civil penalty at issue in Mitchell was not meant to be penal or punitive. Id at 402.
49. Id at 401.
50. Id at 399 (citing Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1874)).
51. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); Rex
Trailer Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex. rel. Marcus v. Hess,
317 U.S. 537 (1943).
52. 317 U.S. 537 (1942).
53. Id. at 539.
54. Id. at 548.
55. In a qui tam action a private party plaintiff brings an action in conjunction with the
United States and "shares with the Government" any proceeds of the action. See United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451, n.11 (1989).
56. Hess, 317 U.S. at 540. The civil penalties authorized by the statute consisted of a
$2,000 forfeiture and double damages. Id at 549.
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constituted
an impermissible second punishment under double jeopar57
dy.
The Hess court followed the statutory construction analysis used in
Helvering v. Mitchell8 and held that the civil penalty authorized by
Congress was intended to be remedial rather than punitive: "We think
the chief purpose of the statutes here was to provide for restitution to
the government of the money taken from it by fraud, and that the device
of double damages plus a specific sum was chosen to make sure that the
government would be made completely whole."59 The Court noted that
while the civil penalty at issue may inadvertently cause a degree of
punishment for an individual, that subjective effect does not override its
predominantly remedial purpose: "'Punishment, in a certain and very
limited sense, may be the result of the statute before us so far as the
wrong-doer is concerned,' but this is not enough to label it as a criminal
statute."' By not examining a sanction's punitive effect for determining punishment, the Hess court reinforced the traditional standard of
statutory construction offered in Mitchell.6
Justice Felix Frankfurter offered a different perspective on multipunishment theory when he concurred with the majority in Hess.6 2 He
believed that the framers never intended the Double Jeopardy Clause to
prevent the government from simultaneously bringing separate civil and
criminal actions for a single act of misconduct.63 Because dual prosecution had traditionally existed and was contemplated by the framers
during the drafting of the Fifth Amendment,' Frankfurter viewed the
bringing of both civil and criminal claims against an individual in one
"comprehensive" punishment scheme as a legitimate exercise of the
legislative power of Congress.65

57. 1. at 548.
58. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
59. See United States ex. rel Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1942).
60. Id. at 551 (quoting Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 157 (1899)).
61. Hess, 317 U.S. at 551-52; Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 399.
62. Hess, 317 U.S. at 553. Frankfurter found the majority's rejection of the multipunishment protection based on statutory structure and legislative intent to be inadequate. Id. at
555-56 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Instead, he formulated an alternative rationale based on
the framer's intent to support the imposition of the civil sanction. Id.
63. Id. at 556. (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "It would do violence to proper regard for
the framers of the Fifth Amendment to assume that they contemporaneously enacted and
continued to enact legislation that was offensive to the guarantees of the double jeopardy
clause which they had proposed for ratification." Id.
64. Id. at 555.
65. Id.
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The Hess precedent was instrumental in deciding a subsequent66
important double jeopardy case. In Rex Trailer Co. v. United States,
the Court encountered the novel problem of a civil sanction that exacted
a penalty from the defendant that exceeded the remedial value of the
defendant's offense, thus seeming punitive. Two years after World War
II, the Rex Trailer Company attempted to gain priority status in
purchasing surplus war vehicles from the government under the Surplus
Property Act.67 The defendant falsely used certain veterans' names to
take advantage of a provision under the Act which gave war veterans
priority status in purchasing excess military goods.' After the defendant pleaded no contest to criminal charges of misconduct, the government fined Rex Trailer $25,000.69 Shortly thereafter, the federal
government brought a civil action against Rex Trailer, seeking liquidated
damages
under the civil forfeiture provision of the Surplus Property
0
Act.

7

The defendant Rex Trailer objected to the subsequent civil action as
being violative of the multipunishment protection.71 It claimed that the
statute's liquidated damages provision obscured a determination of
whether the civil forfeiture was a penal or remedial sanction, because the
government never had to show its actual damages.72 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court held that liquidated damages, despite not reflecting
actual damages, were a civil remedy that did not rise to the level of
punishment.73 Relying on the Hess precedent, the Court reasoned that
because the fixed amount of damages allowable under the statute were
roughly equivalent to the anticipated loss suffered by the government,
the civil sanction could be fairly characterized as remedial.74

66. 350 U.S 148 (1956).
67. Id. at 150; 50 U.S.C. § 1635 (1946 ed.).
68. Rex Trailer Co., 350 U.S. at 150-51.
69. Id. at 149.
70. Il at 149-50.
71. Id. at 150.
72. Id at 152.
73. Id. at 153-54.
74. Ia The Court found that liquidated damages are a typical contract provision that
"serve a particularly useful function when damages are uncertain." Id. (quoting Priebe & Sons
v. United States, 332 U.S. 407,411-12 (1947)). While the exact amount of harm caused by the
defendant Rex Trailer may have been unquantifiable, the Court did find the company's fraud
caused the government some damage: "It precluded bona fide sales to veterans, decreased the

number of motor vehicles available to Government agencies, and tended to promote
undesirable speculation." Rex Trailer Co., 350 U.S. at 153. The Court held that in light of
these injuries, the liquidated damages clause reasonably compensated the government for the
fraud. Id. at 153-54.
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C. ContemporaryApplication of the Multipunishment Protection
In 1969 the Supreme Court applied the Double Jeopardy Clause's
protections to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Benton
v. Maryland.'
It also explicitly recognized the multipunishment
protection as one of three distinct rights offered by the clause in North
Carolina v. Pearce.76
In Pearce, the Court ruled that a state trial

court's imposition of a greater sentence upon retrial without crediting for
previous time served violated the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection

against multiple punishments.'

The Pearce court reasoned that an

individual under those circumstances was being punished more than
legislatively authorized and was effectively being twice punished for the
79

same offense. 78 Pearce, while factually analogous to Ex Parte Lange,

suggested that the main purpose underlying the multipunishment
protection was limited to controlling the sentencing discretion of the trial
court to the boundaries established by the legislature. 0

By the time the Double Jeopardy Clause was applied to the states,
in rem civil forfeitures had become an entrenched phenomenon in the
administration of justice.8 1 Consequently, the Court had developed a

stable of cases addressing whether in rem civil forfeitures implicated the
multipunishment protection. 2 In three important decisions, which later
formed the basis of the Ursery holding, the Supreme Court consistently
upheld in rem civil forfeitures that faced multipunishment attack.'
Various Items of PersonalProperty v. United States 4 provided early
precedent in which the Court held that in rem civil forfeitures did not

75. 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969).
76. 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
77. I at 718.
78. Id.
79. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
80. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717-18; see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984)
(distinguishing between double jeopardy's protection from multiple trials and its protection
from multiple punishments which is primarily intended to control the sentencing power of
judges).
81. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974). See
supra note 6, for further explanation of in rem civil forfeitures.
82. See United States v. 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); One Lot of Emerald Cut
Stones, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam); Various Items of Personal Property v. United States,
282 U.S. 577 (1931).
83. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931); One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam); United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
84. 282 U.S. 568 (1931).
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trigger the double jeopardy protection. In Various Items, the federal
government brought an in rem forfeiture action to recover a distillery,
warehouse, and denaturing plant used for making alcohol for human
consumption during Prohibition. 6 In responding to the defendant's
argument that the multipunishment protection prohibited this forfeiture,
the Court made a crucial distinction between in rem forfeitures and
criminal prosecutions:
It is the property which is proceeded against and, by resort to
legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were
conscious instead of inanimate and insentient. In a criminal
prosecution it is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded
against, convicted and punished. The forfeiture is not part of the
punishment for the criminal offense. The provision of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution in respect of double jeopardy
does not apply.'
In a subsequent case, One Lot of Emerald Cut Stones v. United
States,88 the defendant entered the United States without declaring that
he was carrying certain precious stones and a ring. 9
The federal
government criminally prosecuted the defendant for smuggling and later
brought a civil forfeiture action to recover the smuggled goods." While
subscribing to the Mitchell statutory construction method for evaluating
the civil forfeiture, the Court also noted that the civil in rem forfeiture
brought to recover the smuggled goods was not "so unreasonable or
excessive that it [transformed] what was clearly intended as a civil
penalty into a criminal penalty.'"
More recently in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,'
the Supreme Court enhanced the statutory construction doctrine for
determining whether a government sanction constitutes punishment. In
89 Firearms,the defendant, Patrick Mulcahey, was acquitted of dealing
in firearms without a license.93 The federal government then brought
an in rem civil forfeiture action against Mulcahey seeking to seize the

85. Id. at 581.
86. Id. at 578.
87. IdL
88. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
89. Id. at 237.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 237 (citing Rex Trailer Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United
States ex. rel Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1942); Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630
(1926)).
92. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
93. Id at 356; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) (1976).
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firearms that were used in Mulcahey's illegal gun business. 4 Mulcahey
claimed that because the civil forfeiture was "punitive" it amounted to
a second criminal punishment for the same offense in violation of double
jeopardy. 5 The Supreme Court declined to characterize the forfeiture
as a punitive measure, but in its decision adopted a more comprehensive
statutory construction approach:
Our inquiry in this regard has traditionally proceeded on two
levels. First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in
establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly
or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Second,
where Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil
penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme
was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that
intention.96
By requiring a "further inquiry" into the "purpose" or "effect" of a
sanction, the Court in 89 Firearmsadded a second level to the statutory
construction test of Mitchell v. Helvering. This added scrutiny highlighted a broader effects test that was used in subsequent cases.97
D. Expansion of the Multipunishment Protection: The Halper-AustinKurth Doctrine
1. United States v. Halper
In 1989, the Court expanded the multipunishment protection to civil
penalties. United States v. Halper" represented the first decision in
which the Court, using double jeopardy's multipunishment protection,
invalidated an in personam civil penalty that followed a criminal
conviction.99 The defendant, Irwin Halper, while working as a manager
for a medical lab in New York City, submitted 65 false claims to
Medicare, causing the government to unnecessarily pay out $585 in
disbursements." The federal government uncovered Halper's fraud and
initiated a criminal prosecution against him under the False Claims
Act."' Halper was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison and
94. 89 Firearms,465 U.S. at 356; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (1976).
95. 89 Firearms,465 U.S. at 356.
96. lit at 362-63 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)) (citation
omitted).
97. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989).
98. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).

99. It at 449.
100. l& at 437.
101. lId; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988).
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fined $5,000."°2
After the completion of Halper's criminal prosecution, the federal
government brought a civil action against him under the civil prong of
the False Claims Act."03
Using the evidence from the criminal
conviction, the trial court found that Halper was civilly liable.1' The
federal district court then proceeded to follow the statutory penalty
formula under the civil False Claims Act"°5 and imposed a fine of
$130,000, or $2,000 for each of Halper's 65 violations."t° Upon reflection, the trial court found that this large civil penalty rose to the level of
criminal punishment, reasoning that because the civil fine was so greatly
disproportionate to the underlying offense, it lacked any remedial
character. 1°7 Consequently, the trial court held that double jeopardy's
multipunishment protection barred this civil punishment in light of
Halper's previous criminal sanctions for the same offense.',l
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether Halper's civil
penalty triggered double jeopardy protection.' 9 Counsel for the
government cited a line of precedent, including Mitchell' and
Hess,"' that supported the proposition that the government could
recoup more than its actual financial losses with a civil penalty and also
avoid implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause." 2 However, the Court
rejected the government's precedent as inapplicable, finding that no cited
case addressed Halper's unique situation of a civil penalty that was
13
radically disproportionate to the government's underlying damages.'
The Court held that this imbalance destroyed the remedial quality of the
penalty. 4 The Court also decided that the traditional statutory
construction used in Helvering v. Mitchell"' was not always the best

102. Halper, 490 U.S. at 437.
103. hL at 438; see generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1982 ed. Supp. II).
104. Halper,490 U.S. at 438.
105. Id. The statutory language stated that violators will be "liable to the United States
Government for a civil penalty at $2,000, an amount equal to 2 times the amount of damages
the Government sustains because of the act of that person, and costs of the civil action." Id.
(quoting 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1982)).
106. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438.
107. Id
108. Id

109. Id. at 441.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
United States er. reL Marcus v. Hess, 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
Halper,490 U.S. at 441.
Id. at 446.
Id.

115. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
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determinant of the true nature of some civil penalties levied against an
individual. The Court knew that relying on the statutory construction
technique would legitimize this particular punitive sanction, and thus
looked to the sanction's personal impact on the individual to determine
whether it punishes:
[W]hile recourse to statutory language, structure, and intent is
appropriate in identifying the inherent nature of a proceeding, or
in determining the constitutional safeguards that must accompany
those proceedings as a general matter, the approach is not well
suited to the context of the "humane interests" safeguarded by
the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple punishments. This constitutional protection is intrinsically personal. Its
violation can be identified only by assessing the character of the
actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of
the state."6
The Court held that regardless of legislative label," 7 the civil
penalty authorized by the False Claims Act could be reasonably
characterized as punitive, and thus represented a second punishment
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause."' In seminal language that
would prompt later multipunishment litigation, the Court described when
a civil forfeiture violates the multipunishment protection:
We have recognized in other contexts that punishment serves the
twin aims of retribution and deterrence. Furthermore, "[r]etribution and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental
objectives." From these premises, it follows that a civil sanction
that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term. 9
With its "solely remedial" language and its assessment of the "personal"
impact of a sanction, the Halper decision diminished the traditional
statutory construction method for determining when a sanction
constituted punishment in favor of scrutinizing the sanction's punitive

116. Halper, 490 U.S at 447 (citing Hess, 317 U.S. at 554 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
117. Halper,490 U.S. at 447. The Court noted specifically: "In making this assessment,
the labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance. It is commonly understood
that civil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that
both punitive and remedial goals may be served by criminal penalties." Md (citing Hess, 317

U.S. at 554 (1943) (Frankfurter, J. concurring)).
118. Halper,490 U.S. at 447.
119. I& at 448 (citations ommitted).

1096

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol.80:1081

effect on a defendant. Furthermore, the new standard lowered the
constitutional threshold for when a civil sanction could be subject to
multipunishment attack. After Halper,any sanction that had a punitive
"effect" because of its retributive or deterrent qualities could be
vulnerable to double jeopardy attack. From a practical perspective, the
Halper holding allowed judges to make a more subjective evaluation of
how a sanction personally affects an individual in order to determine
whether it constitutes a second criminal punishment.'20
Due to this unprecedented holding and the potential misconceptions
about the scope of its applicability, the Court was keen to describe the
Halper decision as a "rule for the rare case," narrowly based on its own
unique set of circumstances. 2 1 Justice Kennedy, in his concurring
opinion, seemed equally aware of Halper's potential confusion for lower
courts and legislatures and emphasized that under Halper the government was still entitled to bring a civil action where "the civil penalty
imposed in the second proceeding bears [a] rational relation to the
damages suffered by Government."'"
Even with these limiting
remarks, the Halper holding created such potential benefits for
defendants facing simultaneous civil and criminal sanctions that they
began to utilize it as a double jeopardy defense."z
2. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch
Halper demonstrated how in personam civil forfeitures that are
applied in conjunction with criminal sanctions could implicate the
multipunishment protection. Because the Court described Halper as a
narrow decision that was largely dependent on its particular facts, the
impact of the Court's holding was uncertain. 4 The Supreme Court's
subsequent decision in this area, Department of Revenue of Montana v.
Kurth Ranch,"z confirmed the potentially broad scope of the Halper
rationale for invalidating civil penalties that were imposed along with
criminal sanctions.
The six defendants in Kurth Ranch were all family members who,
while living on a central Montana cattle ranch, engaged in a large

120. See Andrew Z. Glickman, Note, Civil Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy Clause:
Applying the Multiple Punishments Doctrine to Parallel ProceedingsAfter United States v.
Halper, 76 VA. L. REV. 1251, 1267-68 (1990).
121. Halper,490 U.S. 435, 441 (1989).
122. ld. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123. See Glickman, supra note 120, at 1267-68.
124. Halper,490 U.S. at 449-450.
125. 511 U.S. 767 (1994).

1997]

THE MULTIPUNISHMENT PROTECTION

1097

marijuana manufacturing operation.'26 Just prior to the apprehension
of the Kurths, Montana had passed new legislation, called the Dangerous
Drug Tax Act,2 7 which imposed a tax on various illegal drugs possessed in the state.12s After authorities raided the Kurth Ranch and
uncovered the drug operation, the state of Montana charged the
defendants with various criminal drug possession counts and in a
separate proceeding attempted to collect revenues from the Kurths under
the Dangerous Drug Tax Act. 29 The defendants eventually consented
to a plea agreement as to the criminal charges, and two of the Kurths
were given prison terms, while the remaining members were placed on
probation."' The state assessed almost $900,000 in drug taxes against the
defendants due to their drug operations and the family attempted to
dispute the tax in administrative proceedings.13' Before an administrative ruling could take place32 regarding the amount of tax owed, the
Kurths filed for bankruptcy.
In federal bankruptcy court, the Kurths argued that the drug tax
assessed against them was unconstitutional because it violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause's multipunishment protection.
The Bankruptcy Court agreed."
Relying primarily on the Supreme Court's
Halper decision, the court found the high level of the tax had a
significant punitive and deterrent effect, and thus constituted an
impermissible second punishment for the Kurths' original drug offense. 3 The federal district court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court
based on the same reasoning. 3 1 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit equated the tax with the civil forfeiture provision in Halper and
then, after applying Halper's reasoning to the Kurth facts, found that a
tax could be construed as punishment if its sanction went beyond a
remedial state purpose." Because the State of Montana could not
demonstrate a rational relationship required by Halperbetween the tax

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
Revenue

I at 771.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1987).
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 770-71.
i.
Id.at 772.
Id.at 773.
Id
See In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 66 (Bankr. N. D. Mont. 1990).
Id. at 72-73.
Id.
Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 773 (1994).
See In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1993), aff'd, Dep't. of
of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
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and the state's actual damages, the Ninth Circuit found that the tax was
penal 8and consequently barred it under the multipunishment protec13
tion.
On review to the Supreme Court, the majority, in a 5-4 decision, 39
also invalidated the Montana drug tax."
While the Court utilized
much of the Halper decision's reasoning in its analysis, it declined to
strictly apply Halper's test to the drug tax, noting that a tax and the in
personam civil forfeiture at issue in Halper were functionally and
structurally different.1 41 Nevertheless, the Court found the Montana
drug tax was not a traditional revenue-raising tax and had sufficient
punitive effect so as to constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.142
The Court's majority specifically noted three unique factors that
supported the defendants' argument that the drug tax constituted a
second punishment. 43 First, the high tax rate relative to the underlying offense, while not dispositive of the punishment issue, reinforced the
tax's punitive character. 4 ' Second, the tax's triggering mechanism
being actual criminal drug possession indicated that the Montana
legislature sought to deter drug possession rather than raise revenue by
passing the act. 45 Finally, because the tax was levied on goods that
were previously confiscated and no longer possessed by the taxpayer, the
tax closely resembled a punitive fine designed to penalize former drug
possession.' 4'
Kurth Ranch contained three dissents. Two separate dissents
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist 47 and Justice O'Connor 4' both
declined to find that the Montana drug tax was a second punishment, but
rather that it had the remedial state purpose of recouping the costs of
drug enforcement.149 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, rejected

138. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 767-769.
139. Id Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion joined by Justices Blackmun,
Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Thomas dissented. Id.
140. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 776.
141. Id. at 784.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 780-83.
144. Id
145. Id at 781-82.
146. Id at 783.
147. Id at 785 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
148. Id at 792 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 785 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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the legitimacy of double jeopardy's multipunishment protection as
applied to civil sanctions."u Borrowing traditional statutory construction standards for determining a criminal proceeding, Scalia found the
tax to be a legitimate remedial measure that did not trigger double
jeopardy protection.'
3. United States v. Austin
While United States v. Austin"2 was not a multipunishment case,
but rather interpreted the Excessive Fines Clause, it is relevant to civil
forfeiture law because its analysis relied heavily on Halper'spunishment
rationale. The defendant, Richard Lyle Austin, was convicted in South
Dakota state court of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute.'
The federal government then brought a civil in rem forfeiture action
against him, attempting to confiscate his mobile home and auto body
shop used in his drug trafficking activities."5 The defendant contended
that the forfeiture action constituted a violation of the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 5 While the defendant's argument
was rejected by both the federal district court and the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court decided that the Excessive
Fines Clause did act to limit the in rem forfeitures at issue in the

150. hi at 798 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also infra Part III.
151. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 806-09. See also infra Part II.
152. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
153. Ld. at 604.
154. I& at 606; see generally 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)-(7) (1990). The statute states in
pertinent part:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them...
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or
are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of [controlled substances or raw
materials used in manufacturing, compounding, or processing any controlled
substance]...
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used or intended to be used, in any matter or part,
to commit, or to facilitate the commission of a violation of this subchapter
punishable by more than one year's imprisonment ....
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)-(7) (1990).
155. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 606. The Eight Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST.

amend. VIII.
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case.156 The Court reasoned initially that the Excessive Fines Clause
to prevent
applied to punitive civil forfeitures because it was "intended
1 57
the government from abusing its power to punish.
The Court viewed civil forfeitures that punished an individual as
In determining that the
limited by the Excessive Fines Clause.'
forfeiture was punishment, the Court relied heavily on Halper's
statement that "'a civil sanction that cannot be fairly said solely to serve
a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving
either retributive or deterrent purposes is punishment."' 59 Although
the Austin case was decided under the Excessive Fines Clause by using
a standard from a double jeopardy case, the Court indirectly endorsed
the applicability of Halper's double jeopardy analysis to civil forfeitures." In turn, because using double jeopardy results in a wholesale
invalidation of a penalty rather than a simple reduction under the
Excessive Fines Clause, the multipunishment protection became a much
more attractive option for criminal defendants facing in rem civil
forfeitures that could be characterized as punishment under the Halper
standard.
E. The Court's Multipunishment Retreat. United States v. Ursery
On June 24, 1996, the Supreme Court handed down its latest
multipunishment decision in United States v. Ursery."6 ' In Ursery, the
Supreme Court reversed the direction of its previous holdings in Halper,
Austin, and Kurth Ranch and upheld the imposition of in rem civil
forfeiture sanctions that were levied in conjunction with a criminal
penalty. 6 '
The Supreme Court reviewed Ursery, which originated in the Sixth
Circuit, on a consolidated appeal with another case from the Ninth
Circuit, United States v. $405,089.23 in United States Currency.163 While
both cases presented similar factual circumstances, they differed on the
order in which the government imposed the criminal sanction and civil

156. Austin, 509 U.S. at 604-06.
157. Id. at 607 (citing Browning Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257,
266-267 (1989)).
158. United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993).
159. Id. at 610, 621 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
160. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610-11, 621.
161. 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996).
162. Id.
163. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
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sanction. 164

In Ursery, Michigan police discovered a large marijuana manufacturing operation in Guy Jerome Ursery's home."~ Thereafter, the federal
government instituted a civil forfeiture proceeding under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7) to recoup Ursery's residence because it was used in the
manufacturing operation.' 6 Ursery settled the forfeiture suit by paying
the federal government $13,250.167 Ursery was subsequently indicted
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) for manufacturing marijuana."6 After
trial, a jury convicted Ursery of the charge and he was sentenced to 63
months in prison. 69
Ursery appealed his criminal conviction, arguing that his criminal
penalty constituted a second impermissible punishment in violation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause as construed by Halper,Austin, and Kurth
Ranch.70 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Ursery and
reversed his criminal conviction, reasoning that the civil forfeiture
constituted7 punishment and would, therefore, bar subsequent criminal
penalties.1 1

In the other consolidated case, United States v. $405,089.23, two
defendants, Charles Wesley Arlt and James Wren, were convicted of
"conspiracy to aid and abet the manufacture of methamphetamine" in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, as well as conspiracy to launder monetary
instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371."
The district court
sentenced both defendants to life imprisonment and supervised release
time." The federal government also instituted a contemporaneous civil
forfeiture proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6) against property owned by the defendants that was used in
their illegal money laundering and drug operations. 74 After the
conclusion of the criminal trial, the District Court granted the government's motion for summary judgment in the civil forfeiture proceed-

164. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2138.

165. Id at 2138.
166.

Id. at 2138-39. This was the same statute at issue in Austin. See Austin, 509 U.S.

606; see generally 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)-(7) (1990).
167. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2139 (1996).
168. Id; see generally 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1) (1994).
169. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2137.
170. Id. (citing United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995)).
171. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. 2139.
172. Id; see generally 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
173. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2139.
174. Id.; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994).
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ing. 175
Wren and Arlt appealed their civil forfeitures on Double Jeopardy
grounds. 76 The Ninth Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
barred the forfeiture in light of the defendants' earlier criminal
convictions.'7 7 The appellate court reasoned under the Halper and
Austin decisions that these forfeitures constituted punishment.7 8
In reviewing these consolidated cases, the Supreme Court first
addressed whether the Double Jeopardy Clause has a multipunishment
protection.
The Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause
prevented the imposition of successive prosecutions and successive
punishments. 8 °
After reaffirming the validity of the multipunishment protection, the
Court examined whether it would be applicable to the forfeitures at issue
in Ursery.Y The Court ruled that a civil forfeitures imposed on the
defendants did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes,
holding that in rem civil forfeitures at issue were remedial not punitive.' 82
In arriving at its conclusing, the Court borrowed the two part test
from 89 Firearmsto determine whether a forfeiture constitutes "punishment.' ' "m Following 89 Firearms,the Court first examined congressional intent to determine whether the forfeiture was meant to be a
remedial civil sanction or a criminal penalty.Y Second, the Court
looked to see whether the forfeiture was so punitive in fact that it could
not be fairly viewed as civil in nature despite congressional intentions
8
that the forfeiture be applied as a remedial mechanism. 1
In applying the two-part test to the forfeitures in Ursery, the Court
found that Congress intended the statutes to be remedial in nature.Y

175. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2139.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.(citing United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994)).
179. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2139-2140 (1996). This may have been
partly in response to the argument that Justice Scalia made in his Kurth Ranch dissent. See
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 799-803 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2139-40.
181. Id. at 2141.
182. Id. at 2142.
183. Id. at 2147 (citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354,
366 (1984)). See also supra notes 92-97, and accompanying text.
184. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. at 2147.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2147-48.
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The Court noted that the forfeiture statutes promoted awareness among
property owners to prevent illicit activity from occurring on their
property."8 The Court also concluded that the forfeitures at issue in
Ursery were not so punitive in form and effect to transform them into
punitive criminal sanctions for double jeopardy purposes."
Central to its analysis, the Court classified forfeitures in order to
reconcile its past decisions in this area:
Halper dealt with in personam civil penalties under the Double
Jeopardy Clause; Kurth Ranch with a tax proceeding under the
Double Jeopardy; and Austin with civil forfeitures under Excessive Fines Clause. None of those cases dealt with the subject of
[Ursery]: in rem civil forfeitures for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.Y
It characterized in rem civil forfeitures as always having a remedial civil
The
purpose that did not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause.'
the
against
brought
is
Court reasoned that because the in rem forfeiture
item while the criminal sanction is brought against the person, by virtue
of a legal fiction, the individual can never be punished twice. 1
Consistent with this rationale, the Court reasoned that an in personam
civil forfeiture, like the one used in Halper, was more susceptible to
double jeopardy attack, albeit in rare circumstances, because it is brought
against the offender along with a criminal penalty."9 Because this
scheme excluded in rem forfeitures from multipunishment regulation, the
Halper test became an unnecessary determination and the Court
abandoned its application to in rem sanctionsY 3
III. SCALIA'S INDICTMENT OF THE MULTIPUNISHMENT PROTECTION
Justice Antonin Scalia's viewpoint on the multipunishment protection
provides some illuminating alternative reasoning on this doctrine. 94
In Scalia's Kurth Ranch dissent, as well as in his Ursery concurrence, he
recommended that the Court abandon the multipunishment protection

187. Il at 2147.
188. Id. at 2148.
189. Id.
190. id
191. ladat 2144.
192. Id. at 2146.
193. Id.
194. For a general discussion of Justice Scalia's viewpoint on this area, see Christopher
E. Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia and Criminal Justice Cases, 81 KY. L. J. 187, 199-200
(1992-1993).
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altogether for controlling exorbitant civil forfeitures.195 In reaching his
conclusion, he questioned the historical validity of the Double Jeopardy
Clause's multipunishment prong and suggested
that the Excessive Fines
19 6
Clause may be a more appropriate tool.
Justice Scalia recognized that Kurth Ranch and Halper created a
watershed for the Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence.' 97
While Scalia joined the majority decision in Halperwhich invalidated a
civil penalty under the False Claims Act,' 9 he did not follow the
Court's rejection of the Montana drug tax provision in Kurth Ranch.'99
Scalia noted three reasons for abandoning greater use of the multipunishment protection. First, Scalia recognized that the ambiguous
standards for invalidating a civil sanction based on its punitive effect
created an administrative nightmare for the courts." ° Second, Scalia
doubted the historical validity of double jeopardy's multipunishment
prong."' Finally, Justice Scalia, along with Justice O'Connor in her
separate dissent,' argued that the Excessive Fines Clause allows
courts more flexibility in regulating excessive civil sanctions while also
limiting the Double Jeopardy Clause to its traditional role of protecting
individual defendants against a second prosecution for the same
offense.2 3
Scalia's central argument stemmed from the inapplicability of the
Halper analysis to the tax imposed in Kurth Ranch. Scalia understood
that while the majority explicitly rejected the use of Halper's remedial
analysis for the Montana drug tax, it employed much of Halper's
rationale in arriving at the ultimate holding that the tax violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause.' ° Scalia noted that Halper's analysis, which
sought to find a purely remedial purpose for a civil penalty, was more
easily applicable to a civil sanction than a tax provision because a tax

195. See Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 799-803 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2152 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
196. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 803, n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 798-799. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989).
199. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 802-04. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200. Id at 804.
201. Id at 802-03.
202. Id. at 797-98.
203. Id. at 803-05.
204. Id See also infra note 249, for some federal and state decisions that relied on
Halper's analysis to overturn certain civil sanctions.
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always has a non-remedial revenue-raising characteristic.2 5
Scalia found the Kurth majority's nullification of the tax under the
multipunishment protection to be especially troublesome, since it carried
"the implicit assumption that any proceeding which imposes "punishment" within the meaning of the multiple-punishment component of the
Double Jeopardy Clause is a criminal prosecution."'
Scalia reasoned
that the majority's logic would have extreme consequences on governmental functions because, if a civil sanction was invalidated merely
because it carries a punitive effect, then all sanctions, no matter what
kind, have the potential to be invalidated by this standard.2' Furthermore, since the key multipunishment examination under the Halperand
Kurth Ranch precedent was whether an individual was effectively being
punished twice for the same offense, then "the order of punishment
[could not] possibly make any difference."'
Double jeopardy would
always invalidate one of the punitive sanctions: "In the [Kurth Ranch
decision], as in Halper itself we confront the relatively easy task of
disallowing a civil sanction because criminal punishment has already
been imposed. But many cases... will demand much more of us:
disallowing criminal punishment because a civil sanction has already
been imposed."'
Because Scalia viewed Kurth Ranch as dramatically expanding upon
the original Halper multipunishment reasoning,"' he felt obliged to
explore the constitutional validity of the multipunishment prong
altogether: "The difficulty of applying Halper's analysis to Montana's
Dangerous Drug Tax has prompted me to focus on the antecedent
question whether there is a multiple punishments component of the

205. Id. at 787-89 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
206. I& at 805 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. Id at 804. Before Ursery, certain lower court decisions adopted the rationale that
Scalia argued against in his dissent. See supra note 249.
208. Id. at 804. This sentiment was probably why the Ursery court consolidated two
cases in which the civil sanctions were imposed either before or after criminal punishment.
See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2139 (1996).
209. See Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 804 (1994).
Before Ursery, invalidation of subsequent criminal sanctions was a key concern. For example,
many criminal courts witnessed drunk driving prosecutions in which defendants claimed that
their driver's license suspension immediately following their arrest constituted punishment.
They argued that because the license suspension constituted an initial punishment under
double jeopardy, any further criminal punishment for driving while intoxicated would be
unconstitutional under the multipunishment protection. See, e.g., State v. Uncapher, 650
N.E.2d 195 (Ohio Mun. 1995) (rejecting this double jeopardy defense).
210. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 804 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Double Jeopardy Clause." ' '
Scalia found that the true purpose
underlying the multipunishment protection, originating in Ex Parte
Lange"' and carried212through to North Carolina v. Pearce,213 was to
prohibit judicial overreaching in the sentencing of a criminal defendant.214 Scalia believed that double jeopardy should be used to confine
the sentencing judge's discretion to the bounds constructed by the
legislature to avoid imposing multiple punishments for the same
offense.2 15 Based on those decisions, Scalia determined that the
multipunishment protection was really more of a due process protection
"derived from the due process requirement of legislative authorization"
than an implied double jeopardy protection.2 6
Along with his more limited view of the multipunishment protection's scope, Justice Scalia recognized the Excessive Fines Clause as a
better solution to the problem of unusually high civil sanctions imposed
along with a criminal penalty.217 The Excessive Fines Clause of the
218
Eighth Amendment was revitalized "from obscurity" in Austin.
Scalia noted that the Austin decision used similar punishment analysis as
Halper and achieved similar results, but avoided the Halper decision's
unnecessary expansion of double jeopardy's multipunishment protection.219
IV.

CHANGING STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING PUNISHMENT

Before Ursery, the Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch decisions
created the impression that the Supreme Court had constructed a new

"effects" standard for evaluating non-criminal sanctions. By expanding
the multipunishment protection beyond its traditional role of controlling
the sentencing and prosecution of criminal defendants, these cases had
adopted a standard that made time-tested law enforcement procedures
vulnerable to constitutional attack and created a new escape mechanism
211. Id. at 802-03.
212. 85 U.S. (18 Wall) 163 (1873).
213. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
214. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 804 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
215. Id at 800-01.
216. Id at 800.
217. Id at 803 n. 2.
218. See Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kulth Ranch, 511 U.S. 769, 803 n.2 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602 (1993)); see also Alexander
v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause could invalidate
a civil forfeiture when the government was attempting to seize defendant's business and cash
involved in racketeering operation).
219. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 803.
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for criminal defendants.
A.

The Legislative Intent Test Before the Halper-Austin-Kurth
Precedent
From the initial multipunishment analysis of Helvering v. Mitchellt the Supreme Court has looked for indications of what the
legislature intended when it authorized a sanction, to determine whether
it was designed to punish. 1 For a civil sanction to constitute punishment, the legislature must create the penalty and the courts must
implement the sanction for the purpose of punishing. m Proving that
a sanction is punitive under multipunishment analysis is difficult as courts
will presumptively look to a non-remedial regulatory purpose for the
sanction and show deference to the legislature.'
Courts use a variety of indicators to decide whether the legislature
intended a civil sanction to punish. In deciphering the legislature's
intent, legislative history, statutory language, and procedural structures
provide the most important indications for determining the nature of the
sanction. 4 In particular, legislation that contains separate criminal and
civil sanctions accompanied by separate procedures suggests the
legislature enacted the separate civil sanction to be a non-punitive
remedial measure.'
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez6 and subsequently in United
States v. Wardtm the United States Supreme Court established a
related framework for judging the punitive intent of legislation in order
to provide a defendant with the proper procedural protections. In both
cases, the defendants faced civil penalties.'
However, they claimed
that regardless of the penalty's civil label, they were entitled to the
procedural protections that the Constitution afforded criminal defendants 9 The Court found that a proceeding designed to punish could

220. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).

221. Id at 399.
222. Id.
223. See Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617-621 (1960).
224. See Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 399.

225. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984);
Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 399.
226. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).

227. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
228. I& at 245, 247-49.
229. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 159-161; Ward, 448 U.S. at 247.
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trigger various procedural due process rights.m
In essence, the
Kennedy-Ward test exemplified strict legislative construction and its
overlapping analysis could have provided a useful tool for evaluating
multipunishment questions."1 The Halper court, while acknowledging
that the Kennedy-Ward test may have been useful in determining
whether a civil forfeiture constituted punishment under double jeopardy,
declined to adopt its analytical framework.2 2
Under Kennedy-Ward, the individual defendant faces a huge burden
in proving that a civil forfeiture provision constitutes a criminal
proceeding, thus necessitating the use of certain procedural due process
elements 33 The Kennedy-Ward intent test offers a seven-factor
method of determining the punitive nature of a sanction and provides a
narrow focus for judicial subjectivity.'
The deferential language of
the test acknowledges the legislature's power to simultaneously punish
and regulate 35 Consequently, legislatures have much leeway in
crafting both punitive and remedial mechanisms3 6
Statutory construction has always had its significant disadvantages.
First, legislative intent is rarely recorded, especially on a state level, so
the reasons for a statutory enactment can be impossible to discoVer3 7
When legislative history for a statute can be found, it usually demonstrates conflicting legislative motivations among various legislators.38

230. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-169. The Court highlighted seven factors for
determining if a civil proceeding requires procedural due process safeguards afforded criminal
defendants:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution or deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry [into whether a
proceeding is penal or remedial], and may often point in differing directions.
Id.
231. See Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767,806 (1994) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
232. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989).
233. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 806-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. la.; see also supra note 230 and accompanying text.
235. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69; see also supra note 230.
236. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69; see also Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617-621
(1960) (holding that a statute will always carry the presumption of constitutionality).
237. See J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penaltiesand Forfeitures:A Frameworkfor
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 443 (1976).
238. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968).
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Furthermore, analysis of statutory language and structure often provides
ambiguous messages." Legislative intent also does not necessarily
solve the unusual problem of a normally remedial sanction inadvertently
having a punitive effect on a particular defendant.2' The Halper court
seemed to recognize these shortcomings, and also realized that an intent
test would not provide the defendant Halper any relief in his unique
situation.241 Consequently, the Court used an "effects" test for determining whether to invoke multipunishment protection.242
B. The Effects Test Under the Halper-Austin-Kurth Precedent
Both United States v. Austin and Departmentof Revenue of Montana
v. Kurth Ranch, with their muddied view of punishment, essentially
completed a journey that Halperhad begun, moving away from strictly
evaluating the legislative purpose underlying a civil sanction to examining its punitive effects.243 By using much of Halper's language which
dismissed statutory construction in favor of examining the "personal"
impact of a punitive sanction, the Kurth Ranch and Austin decisions
seemingly punctuated the Court's increased acceptance of a broader
multipunishment doctrine.'
The effects standard for punishment
focused on the stigma and burden placed on the sanctioned individual as
the determinative factor of a punitive state measure.245 In Kurth
Ranch, the majority used this standard at various points in its opinion:
"[A]t some point, an exaction labeled as a tax approaches punishment,
and our6 task is to determine whether Montana's drug tax crosses that
,24

line.

Because the Court invalidated a variety of different sanctions,
Halper,Austin, and Kurth Ranch produced a momentum that suggested
that other governmental sanctions-imposed administratively or

239. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530-31 (1975).
240. See, eg., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
241. Id.at 447.
242. It.
243. See Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 802-803 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
244. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779-80; Halper,490 U.S. at 447.
245. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 778-80. The majority reasoned that the tax was
punitive, citing to explicit legislative intent language that highlighted the "burden" the tax
would place on drug law violators. Id at 780 n.18. While the Court seems to have been using
typical statutory construction by looking at legislative intent, emphasizing the "burden" on the
violator is an effects standard. I& Rehnquist criticized the Court's mixed bag of standards
as an unclear "hodgepodge of criteria". Id. at 785. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
246. Iit at 780.
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civilly-could be barred by the multipunishment protection. Under the
Halper test, almost any sanction could have potentially constituted
punishment, because most sanctions have some punishing consequences
that directly affect an individual defendant. This subjectivity exposes the
difficulty in classifying a sanction that has both punitive and remedial
qualities-no bright line determinations exist for deciding whether a
sanction simply carries a "sting of punishment" or whether it constitutes
a true criminal penalty.247
The Hess and Mitchell courts minimized this inherent subjectivity by
adhering to the more definitive legislative intent standard.2' While not
an optimal barometer for determining what sanctions punish, legislative
structure, language, and intent provide at least some objective measures
to differentiate penal from remedial sanctions. To a large extent this
method was abandoned by Halper.
V. THE IMPACT OF THE URSERY DECISION

A. The Ursery Multipunishment Standard
The Halper standard for evaluating civil sanctions represented a
departure from the traditional statutory construction used by the Court.
The subsequent Kurth Ranch and Austin decisions signified a continuation of the Halperrationale and suggested that if a tax or an in rem civil
forfeiture could be considered punitive, then almost any civil sanction
could be similarly characterized. These decisions gave the double
jeopardy multipunishment prong new life, and, consequently, other state
sanctions imposed in conjunction with a criminal penalty became
vulnerable to double jeopardy attack.249
247. See United States ex. reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1942).
248. Id; see also Mitchell v. Helvering, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
249. The cases that the Ursery court reviewed on consolidated appeal provide examples
of how Halper-Austin-Kurthdoctrine triggered increased application of the multipunishment
protection among some of the federal circuits. See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 575
(6th Cir. 1995); United States v. $405,089.23 in United States Currency, 56 F.3d 41, 42 (9th Cir.
1995). See also United States v 9844 S. Titan Court, Unit 9, Littleton, Co., 75 F.3d 1470, 1491
(10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the multipunishment protection invalidated the forfeiture of
home, other items used in drug offense due to previous criminal penalty).
Before Ursery many state courts also adopted the Halper-Austin-Kurthtreatment of the
multipunishment protection. See, e.g., Wilson v. Dep't of Revenue, 662 N.E. 2d 415, 420 (Iii.
1996) (holding that drug tax violated double jeopardy's multipunishment protection); Clifft v.
Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 641 N.E.2d 682, 685 (Ind. Tax 1994) (also holding that drug
tax violated double jeopardy's multipunishment protection); City of New Hope v. 1986 Mazda
626, 546 N.W. 2d 300, 303 (Minn. App. 1996) (holding that forfeiture of car violated the
multipunishment protection due to previous criminal conviction for driving-while-intoxicated);
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The Ursery court sought to contain the Halper-Austin-Kurthdoctrine
by categorizing various civil forfeitures that could be invalidated under
The Court distinguished its prior
the multipunishment protection.'
multipunishment precedent, noting that Halperdealt with an in personam
penalty, Kurth Ranch concerned a tax, and the Austin decision was
decided under the Excessive Fines Clause." 1 The Court concluded that
the multipunishment protection has historically never applied to in rem
civil forfeitures like the sanctions at issue in Ursery.22 Thus, under the
rationale used in Ursery, while inpersonamcivil penalties could implicate
the double jeopardy multipunishment protection, in rem civil forfeitures
never trigger double jeopardy attack because they are never brought
against a person, but against the instrumentalities used to commit a
crime. 3 Consequently, an individual defendant, facing both a civil
forfeiture and a criminal penalty, could never sustain two punishments
for one offense.
The Court also reasoned that because in rem forfeitures serve largely
remedial purposes of making illegal behavior unprofitable or impossible,
they will never implicate the double jeopardy multipunishment protection.' In reaching this conclusion, the Court was assuming a case in
which a forfeited instrumentality was related to the commission of a
crime, whereby its forfeiture acts as a remedial measure that will prevent
the instrumentality from being used in the same fashion again. 5
Because the Ursery decision hinges on a stark system of categorization in its application of the multipunishment protection, the majority
rests on a premise that has some logical inconsistencies. The decision's
most blatant problem is evident in how it distinguishes between in
personam civil penalties and in rem civil forfeitures.1 6 Under Ursery,

Desimone v. State, 904 P.2d 1, 4 (Nev. 1995) (holding that assessment of drug taxes and civil
penalties precluded subsequent criminal conviction under the multipunishment protection);
State v. Davis, 903 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah 1995) (holding that forfeiture of vehicle precluded
subsequent criminal prosecution for drug possession under the multipunishment protection).
250. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2142 (1996).
251. AL
252. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142.
253. Id.
254. 1&
255. Ursery also considered forfeiture of contraband and proceeds, although as Justice
Stevens clearly points out, forfeiture of those items can never implicate the multipunishment
protection, because the criminal defendant never had a valid legal interest in them. See
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 3215 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
256. See Rachel L. Brand, Civil Forfeiture as Jeopardy: United States v. Ursery, 116 S.
Ct. 2135 (1996), 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 292, 304-06 (1996).
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while an in personam penalty, like the fine in Halper, can be sufficiently
punitive to trigger the multipunishment protection, the in rem forfeiture
of a home or other similar instrumentality, which could amount to a
greater monetary loss than an in personam penalty, could never bring
about double jeopardy protection. "
The Court explains this inconsistency by emphasizing that double
jeopardy's multipunishment protection has historically never applied to
in rem forfeitures because those actions are technically brought against
items, not individuals, whereas multipunishment protection can apply to
in personam forfeitures because they are brought against individuals.28
This reliance on the historical application of the multipunishment
protection was made easy by the numerous past cases concerning in rem
forfeitures. 9 However, the Court would have a more difficult time
similarly analyzing other non-traditional civil sanctions, such as
administrative suspensions, that have gained prevalance in contemporary
law enforcement, yet have not faced extensive multipunishment scrutiny.
As another shortfall, the Ursery court engaged in only limited
statutory construction in its evaluation of in rem forfeitures. It should
have more heavily relied on traditional statutory construction analysis
and avoided the inflexible application of the multipunishment protection
according to rigid in rem or in personam categories. Using statutory
construction would have revealed that the forfeitures at issue in Ursery
were not designed by the legislature to punish a criminal defendant.
Instead, the forfeitures were directed against the owner of the forfeited
property in order to prevent its use in criminal activities. If the owner
and criminal defendant happen to be the same individual, such an
occurrence would be purely coincidental. In essence, an in rem forfeiture
is designed by the legislature to prevent criminal activity, which is a
remedial purpose. The Court could have easily explained that the in rem
forfeiture at issue in Ursery was designed
to yield the remedial benefit
2°
of stopping future criminal activity.
Ursery also leaves unanswered Halper'scall to assess a civil sanction's
personal impact on an individual defendant in determining whether the
sanction punishes. 261 Unquestionably, an in rem civil forfeiture can
have as much of a personal impact on a defendant as would a punitive

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142.
See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2145.
Halper,490 U.S. at 447.
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in personam sanction. In this regard, possibly the Court's greatest error
in Ursery was its failure to overrule the awkward language of Halperand
simply examine whether a sanction has a reasonably significant remedial
impact that could legitimately be considered non-punitive.
Another problem with the Ursery decision is that its reasoning creates
a huge umbrella that allows all in rem civil forfeitures to withstand
multipunishment attack. In fact, under certain circumstances many of
those forfeitures could be fairly construed as punitive measures. To that
end, Justice Stevens' partial concurrence argues that the Court should
have distinguished between certain types of in rem forfeitures so that
forfeitures of contraband and proceeds of illegal activity will never
trigger the double jeopardy protection whereas forfeiture of instrumentalities could produce second jeopardy if deemed sufficiently punitive.262
B. Alternatives to Ursery
Aside from its tenuous rationale, Ursery is a boon for law enforcement. Before Ursery, law enforcement faced increasing pressure to
counter criminal defendants' ever-increasing multipunishment arguments. 26 In solving this problem, law enforcement could have opted
for two solutions. One way to avoid the multipunishment defense would
have been to impose all civil sanctions and criminal sanctions in one
unified proceeding, since this has historically not implicated double
jeopardy's multipunishment protection. 2 4 However, this would have
challenged both state and federal governments to structurally reorganize
their civil and criminal prosecution procedures and personnel, which
might have been an impossible task given the complex nature of federal
and state enforcement arms.2'
Furthermore, due to the differing
burdens of proof, imposing civil and criminal sanctions in one proceeding
may have also been a procedurally difficult option.26

262. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2152-2163 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
263. See supra note 249 for examples of successful multipunishment arguments made by
defendants prior to Ursery.
264. See Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778-79 (1994);
Halper, 490 U.S. at 450. The government made this argument in Ursery, but the Court
decided the case on other grounds. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2140 n.1.

265. See generally Glickman, supra note 119, at 1271 n.117 (suggesting that the federal
government would be challenged to overhaul its civil and criminal prosecutions in light of
Halper).
266. Id. at 1280-81.
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Similar to imposing all sanctions in a single unified proceeding, law
enforcement could also have argued that the doctrine of continuing
jeopardy prevents the multipunishment protection from invalidating
punitive civil sanctions. The concept of continuing jeopardy runs
contrary to the Halper-Kurth rationale, but not against most other
double jeopardy case law.267 Continuing jeopardy was previously
advanced in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in United States ex.
rel. Marcus v. Hess where he noted that the framers never envisioned the
Double Jeopardy Clause to preclude the government from imposing both
civil and criminal sanctions for one offense.2"
Under continuing
jeopardy, both civil and criminal sanctions would be considered part of
one single proceeding even if imposed at different times.269 Both
sanctions could be punitive, since they would be considered part of an
overall comprehensive scheme created by the legislature to sanction
illegal conduct.27°
C. The Impact of Ursery
The Ursery majority, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, emphasized through past precedent that a more limited multipunishment
protection exists within the Double Jeopardy Clause. The majority
specifically noted that many cases indicate that the multipunishment
protection was designed simply to protect judicial overreaching during
sentencing,27 but nowhere--except in Halper and Kurth Ranch-had
the Court used double jeopardy to invalidate separate civil sanctions.'
While Ursery limited double jeopardy's power to regulate civil
forfeitures to all but a few cases, criminal defendants are not without
recourse in the event that the government seeks a penalty that is vastly
disproportionate to the remedial cost of the defendant's offense.
Increased application of the Excessive Fines Clause may be the necessary
tool to achieve a balance between regulating excessive forfeitures and

267. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 800-02. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268. See United States ex. reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 553 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
269. Id.
270. hd2at 555.
271. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717-18 (1969); see also United States
v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 (citing Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873))
(suggesting that Ex Parte Lange would never have needed to be decided if Congress would
have allowed both fine and imprisonment in sentencing of defendant).
272. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 802-05. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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allowing the government remedial benefits of civil sanctions.
Using the Excessive Fines Clause to regulate civil sanctions yields
benefits for both the criminal defendant and government interests. First,
with the Excessive Fines Clause, the defendant has the benefit of having
a reviewing court reduce any forfeitures to a non-excessive level, thereby
protecting the criminal defendant from incurring a second punishment. 74 Second, because the Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated, prosecutors can utilize both criminal and civil sanctions against the
defendant, without invalidating one at the expense of the other. 75
Furthermore, using the Excessive Fines Clause will theoretically preserve
the true remedial benefits of the civil sanction imposed on the defendant. 76
VI.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's clarification of the double
jeopardy multipunishment protection in United States v. Ursery bodes
well for government agencies and law enforcement who have become
accustomed to forfeitures as both a significant revenue source and as
remedial tool to assist in their regular enforcement operations. A limited
multipunishment protection will likely promote greater use of in rem civil
forfeitures.
Nevertheless, Ursery has some deficiencies. Ursery fails to directly
answer Halper'scall to assess the subjective impact of a civil sanction on
an individual defendant. More importantly, under Ursery, an excessive
in rem civil forfeiture which has an identical monetary value to an in
personam civil penalty like the one in Halper would be valid and
enforceable in the face of double jeopardy attack.
Criminal defendants facing punitive civil sanctions are not without
recourse. Now that the Supreme Court has restricted the multipunishment protection in the civil forfeiture arena, defendants can still utilize
the Excessive Fines Clause to avoid a punitive civil forfeitures.

273. See Elizabeth S. Jahncke, Note, United States v. Halper,Punitive Civil Fines, and
the Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 112, 139-140 (1991).
274. See United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 627 (1993). "In the case of a monetary
fine, the Eighth Amendment's origins in the English Bill of Rights, intended to limit the
abusive penalties assessed against the king's opponents, demonstrate that the touchstone is
value of the fine in relation to the offense." Id. at 627 (citing Browning-Ferris Industries v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1989)).
275. See United States ex. reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 553 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
276. Al.
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Furthermore, the multipunishment protection still safeguards defendants
facing punitive in personam civil penalties as well as various other civil
sanctions.
PATRICK
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